HKSYU Course Resources
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LEADER 03664cam a2200409 i 4500
001
991008210867907546
005
20240516100300.0
008
230524s2023 sz b 000 0 eng d
020
z| 9783031276019
q| (eBook)
020
z| 3031276019
q| (eBook)
020
a| 9783031276002
020
a| 3031276000
035
a| (OCoLC)1379855321
z| (OCoLC)1379446118
z| (OCoLC)1379451322
z| (OCoLC)1379476858
040
a| GW5XE
b| eng
e| rda
e| pn
c| GW5XE
d| YDX
d| EBLCP
d| HK-SYU
050
4
a| QA269
b| .W457 2023
082
0
4
a| 519.3
2| 23/eng/20230524
092
0
a| 519.3
b| WEI 2023
100
1
a| Weiss, Uri,
d| 1980-
e| author
245
1
0
a| Games to play and games not to play :
b| strategic decisions via extensions of game theory /
c| Uri Weiss, Joseph Agassi.
246
3
0
a| Strategic decisions via extensions of game theory.
264
1
a| Cham :
b| Springer,
c| [2023]
264
4
c| ©2023
300
a| xi, 236 pages ;
c| 25 cm.
336
a| text
b| txt
2| rdacontent
337
a| unmediated
b| n
2| rdamedia
338
a| volume
b| nc
2| rdacarrier
490
1
a| Studies in systems, decision and control,
x| 2198-4182 ;
v| volume 469
504
a| Includes bibliographical references.
520
a| This book contributes to the theatrical discussions of equilibria that rest on error-in which we include mistaken choices of games to play. Extant game theory recommends diverse strategies (plans of actions) for various given games, particularly those in Nash equilibria, in which no player benefits from one-sided strategy alteration. The literature also refers to the design of games that fit given goals. This is the mechanism design theory; its function is to serve social planners ignorant of the preferences of the people intended to play them. Our study of games avoidance adds to game theory the meta-game of choosing what game to play and what game to avoid playing, and that both players and planners can generate. This comprises a shift from the maximalist position that aims to maximize possible profit to the minimalist one that aims at minimizing possible loss. This shift depends on the question, considering the public interest, what set of games is it advisable to encourage? Obviously, it is advisable to encourage playing some groups of games such as trade, as well as to discourage playing other groups of games such as wars. This shift makes the theory much more applicable to social science: usually, choosing what game to play is less practical than choosing what game not to play. This invites legislation and similar incentives; their study should aim at the improvement of their usefulness. Discussing the possibility of changing both game and strategy renders game theory part-and-parcel of social science. For this mathematical models will not do: it requires a clear distinction between describing options and explaining situations. Explanations may enhance efforts at improvement
505
0
a| Introduction: Game Theory and Peace -- Strategic Decisions: Game and Strategy: Extended Game Theory -- Game Theory Encourages Peace -- International Accords -- Game Theory as Part-and-parcel of Social Science -- The Game Theory of the European Union versus the Pax Romana -- Playing the Game of International Law -- Mutual Threat: The Game of the Cold War -- Equilibria in Games of War and Peace: Options for Cooperation -- The Game not Chosen: Equilibria of Games about Games
650
0
a| Game theory.
650
0
a| Decision making.
700
1
a| Agassi, Joseph,
e| author
830
0
a| Studies in systems, decision and control ;
v| v. 469.
910
b| kkl
c| wsl
998
a| book
b| 16-05-24
945
h| Supplement
l| location
i| barcode
y| id
f| bookplate
a| callnoa
b| callnob
n| BUS318